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Europeanization: A Governance Approach 
 
Introduction 
Most scholars deal with Europeanization as the impact of the EU’s impact on Member 
States, while others (notably Helen Wallace, 2000) view the EU as one feature of 
Europeanization. The focus here is on the former. Wallace’s arguments are important 
in highlighting the importance of placing the impact of the EU on Member States in 
the context of other sources of change. However, the purpose here is to understand the 
effect on politics in the domestic arena of the EU, which is, as Olson (2002:6) notes, 
the ‘core political project in Europe’ (Olsen, 2002: 6).  
 
Europeanization studies reveal considerable variation in the impact of the EU on 
member states. In this context, this paper argues for an approach to Europeanization 
that is sensitive to the national context. As such, the governance approach offered 
here incorporates the insights of the Differentiated Polity (DP) model developed by 
Rhodes as an organising perspective for understanding contemporary British politics 
and government.  
  
The paper has seven sections. Section two considers a number of first generation 
Europeanization studies, which focus on institutional adaptation to EU pressures; 
section three considers second generation concerns of ideas, values and identity; 
section four addresses the definitional issues that abound in the literature and suggests 
a definition that embraces first and second generation concerns; section five develops 
a governance approach to the study of Europeanization; section six utilises this 
approach in relation to EU regional policy; section seven concludes by reflecting on 
the utility of the governance approach to Europeanization.  
 
Europeanization Studies 
Studies on Europeanization as the impact of the EU on domestic politics have 
generally used different definitions of Europeanization, but reveal a number of 
common themes and conclusions. 
 
In looking at France, Ladrech (1994) defined Europeanization as  
 
‘an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech, 1994: 
69).  
 
He argued that ‘organizations respond to changes in the perceptions of interest and 
value that occur in the principles, norms and institutional design of the regime in 
which they are embedded’ (Ladrech, 1994: 71-72). Ladrech suggested that while the 
reorientation of domestic organizational logics is a feature of Europeanization, the 
homogenisation or harmonization of domestic practices across Europe is not a 
realistic expectation. Instead, pre-existing domestic structures and internal 
developments are likely to have an important mediating effect on ‘external’ pressures. 
Thus, Ladrech (1994: 84) advocated a ‘bottom-up’ approach to understanding the 
effects of Europeanization, one that focuses on ‘national-specific adaptation to cross  3 
national inputs’. In a later contribution, Ladrech left out the reference to 
Europeanization as an ‘incremental process’ to broaden his definition of the term (see 
Olsen, 2002). 
 
Cowles et al (2001) defined Europeanization as: 
 
‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with 
political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of 
policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules’ 
(Cowles et al, 2001: 3).  
 
However, while accepting Europeanization as a two-way process, their focus was on 
the ‘downward causation’ from the EU level to domestic structures. The study 
focused on two categories of domestic structure: policy structures, a concern beyond 
policy content, extending to changes in political, legal and administrative policy 
structures; and system-wide domestic structures, which relate to changes in ‘the 
nation-state, its society and economy as a whole’ (Cowles et al, 2001: 3). 
 
Their findings echoed those of Ladrech and others (below), namely that there is 
‘“domestic adaptation with national colors” in which national features continue to 
play a role in shaping outcomes’ (Cowles et al, 2001: 1). They emphasised the 
importance of ‘fit’ between EU level changes and existing structures, policies and 
practices at the domestic level: poor fit implies strong adaptational pressure, good fit 
implies weak pressure. However, adaptational pressure does not necessarily lead to 
domestic change. The extent to which there is change in response to adaptational 
pressure depends on five intervening factors: ‘multiple veto points in the domestic 
structure, facilitating institutions, a country’s organizational and policymaking 
cultures, the differential empowerment of domestic actors, and learning’ (Cowles et 
al, 2001: 2).  
 
In studying Britain, Bulmer and Burch’s (1998) use of Europeanization referred to  
 
‘the extent to which EC/EU requirements and policies have affected the 
determination of member states’ policy agendas and goals’ and ‘the extent to 
which EU practices, operating procedures and administrative values have 
impinged on, and become embedded in, the administrative practices of 
member states’ (Bulmer and Burch, 1998: 602).  
 
Their empirical study looked at the implications of Europeanization on the machinery 
of central government and argued that ‘while change has been substantial, it has been 
more or less wholly in keeping with British traditions’ (Bulmer and Burch, 1998: 603) 
 
Bulmer and Burch’s study draws on historical institutionalism, with an explicit 
recognition of the importance of the political dimension. Their study points to the 
importance of conceptual lenses in shaping responses to Europeanization, arguing that 
at key junctures, a critical aspect has been how the administrative response has been 
shaped by how European integration has been perceived and constructed by national 
elites. They illustrate ‘how the construction of the issue of integration interacts with 
the prevailing characteristics of national governmental machinery to explain the  4 
different starting points for national adaptation’ (Bulmer and Burch, 1998: 606). 
Related to this, is the argument that ‘However efficient, the official side of the 
machine cannot work to full effect if there is a lack of momentum on the political side 
(Bulmer and Burch, 1998: 608)  
 
Finally, in a study for the Europeanization of the Scottish Office, Smith (2001:160) 
argued that ‘while the culture has undergone subtle realignment in adapting to 
‘European’ administrative practice, the overall ethos and parameters of the culture 
have not been altered to any great extent’ Cultural effects were contained within the 
established boundaries of British administrative culture.  
 
Domestic Adaptation 
Olsen developed the theme of domestic adaptation to Europeanization pressures. In 
summarizing existing research, he argued that: 
 
‘The most standard institutional response to novelty is to find a routine in the 
existing repertoire of routines that can be used (March and Olsen 1989: 34). 
External changes are interpreted and responded to through existing 
institutional frameworks, including existing causal and normative beliefs 
about legitimate institutions and the appropriate distribution, exercise and 
control of power’ (Olsen, 2002: 10).  
 
The first explanation for variation in the impact of Europeanization is the variation in 
the adaptive pressures ‘coming down’ from the EU, according to the degree to which 
the EU has developed institutions and competences in policy areas. Following 
Jacobson’s (2001: 20) work on adaptive pressures from international bodies, Olsen 
argued that: 
 
They are more likely to have an impact and be complied with, the more 
precise their legal foundation; when they are based on hard law rather than 
soft law; when the affected parties (constituent units) have been involved in 
developing the arrangement; the greater the independence of their secretariat; 
if the secretariat is single-headed rather than multiple-headed; and the greater 
the financial autonomy of the institution or regime. 
 
In a similar vein, Knill (2000: 213) argued that ‘it is the specific Europeanization 
mechanism rather than the nominal policy area that is most important in determining 
the domestic impact of EU policies’. 
 
Olsen’s second explanation for variation in the impact of Europeanization points to 
different responses to adaptive pressures across member states because ‘the (West) 
European political order is characterized by long, strong and varied institutional 
histories, with different trajectories of state- and nation-building, resources and 
capabilities’ (Olsen, 2002: 10).  
 
Common Themes 
These studies have employed contrasting definitions and approaches, but the 
collective view is that the impact of the EU on domestic politics varies both across 
states and within states across different dimensions (e.g., policy sectors, actors, 
institutions). In broad terms, this is because there are variations in the pressures  5 
coming from the EU-level and there are variations in the response of domestic actors 
and institutions according to how these pressures fit with domestic preferences and 
practices. There is also consensus that, in trying to understand the impact of the EU 
on domestic politics, this is a two-way process: ‘member states are not simply passive 
recipients of pressures from the EU; they also try to project national policy 
preferences upwards’ (George, 2001: 1). Further, while there is a tendency in some 
literatures to treat the EU as an independent variable affecting the dependent variable 
of domestic politics, there is an emerging consensus that ‘the language and logic of 
fixed dependent and independent variables, can become a strait jacket preventing an 
adequate theoretical and empirical analysis of European dynamics of change’ (Olsen, 
2002: 21).  
 
In summary, only by understanding what is being ‘downloaded’ from the EU in 
relation to what is being and has been ‘uploaded’ from member states, and 
contextualising this dynamic in relation to broader international processes and 
independent domestic sources of change can we understand of the process of 
Europeanization. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
Drawing on the literature reviewed above, a number of hypotheses in relation to 
Europeanization are highlighted: 
 
•  pre-existing domestic structures and internal developments are likely to have 
an important mediating effect on ‘external’ Europeanization pressures. The 
result is likely to be ‘domestic adaptation with national colours’, but 
adaptational pressure from EU decisions does not necessarily lead to domestic 
change. 
•  EU decisions are more likely to have an impact and be complied the more 
precise their legal foundation and when the affected parties (constituent units) 
have been involved in developing the arrangement. 
•  It is the specific Europeanization mechanism rather than the nominal policy 
area that is most important in determining the domestic impact of EU policies. 
•  Europeanization is most likely to occur when there is both domestic 
administrative and political support for compliance.  
 
 
Ideas, Values and Identities 
Much of the literature on Europeanization surveyed above focused on institutional 
adaptation. However, as Olsen (2002) argued, Europeanization is not limited to 
changes in political-administrative structures and policy content, but ‘European values 
and policy paradigms are also to some (varying) degree internalized at the domestic 
level, shaping discourses and identities’.  
 
In the same vein, Dyson and Goetz (2002) identified ‘two generations’ of 
Europeanization analyses, with the second generation placing greater emphasis on 
non-institutional adaptation. The first generation can be traced back to the early 
1970s, while the second generation emerged in the 1990s. The key features of each 
generation of research are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1 – Summary of Dyson and Goetz on the ‘two generations of Europeanization 
research’ 
 
First Generation  Second Generation 
•  top-down perspective, seeking to explain 
domestic reactions to pressures from 
above 
•  emphasizes both top-down and bottom-up, 
vertical and horizontal dimensions 
•  assumed ‘mismatch’ between European 
and domestic levels – particularly legal, 
institutional and procedural 
•  greater emphasis on interests, beliefs, values 
and ideas: the ‘political’ dynamics of fit 
•  emphasized reactive and involuntary 
nature of adaptation 
•  greater emphasis on voluntary adaptation 
through policy transfer and learning 
•  focused on policy and polity dimensions  •  greater emphasis on politics, e.g., identities, 
electoral behaviour, parties and party systems 
•  expected increasing cross-national 
convergence 
•  emphasizes differential impact of Europe 
•  defined Europeanization in substantive 
terms – focus on the ‘end state’ effects 
•  emphasizes impact of Europeanization on 
domestic political, institutional and policy 
dynamics 
 
The second generation analyses provide a broader coverage of Europeanization 
effects that complement rather than invalidate the first wave. Anderson (2002: 9) 
captures the broader concerns of second generation analyses through the categories of 
interests, institutions and ideas: 
 
•  Interests are causally important because they directly shape policy responses by 
establishing a distribution of societal preferences that national officials take into 
account as they seek to build electoral coalitions capable of winning and then 
holding political power.  
 
•  Institutions influence what actors do or do not do by allocating power to some 
actors but not others, structuring the content and sequence of policy making, and 
providing opportunities for and constraints on the state as its officials seek societal 
support for their policy choices.  
 
•  Ideas matter because they enable actors to manage uncertainty about the expected 
consequences of alternative choices, and they provide actors with a symbolic and 
conceptual language to advance their causes. In the context of strategic interaction 
among numerous actors, shared ideas can bring about the convergence of 
expectations and strategies facilitating agreement and cooperative outcomes. 
 
While these categories are separated for analytical purposes, in reality they are not 
independent. Actor interests are shaped both by the institutional framework, which 
constrains the range of possibilities, and by the value structure through which 
individual actors perceive their interests. Moreover, while these categories are 
identified for analytical purpose as domestic categories, in reality they are not sealed 
of from the external environment. In short, Anderson (2002: 10) argues, ‘membership 
in the EC/EU “matters”, in that it automatically entails mutilayered interactions of 
interests, institutions, and ideas at and across the national and supranational levels’.  
  7 
Definitional issues 
The discussion above referred to a number of definitions of Europeanization. For 
analytical purposes, three broad types of Europeanization can be identified (Table 2), 
although, again, the reality is messier. The first type refers to the growing authority 
and competences of EU level actors and institutions; the second type considers the 
impact of this growing authority and competences on domestic politics; the third type 
focuses on interconnections and transfer mechanisms between European states, either 
with or without an EU focus. As noted at the outset, this paper is concerned with the 
second type of Europeanization, notwithstanding the argument that this form of 
Europeanization is likely to be most fully understood by exploring its relationship 
with the other types. Type 1 Europeanization would seem largely synonymous with 
the process of European integration, so why rename this process? (see Bulmer and 
Gamble, 2002). On the other hand, Type 3 Europeanization has concerns that are 
often separate from the EU.  
 
Table 2: Types of Europeanization 
 
Type Focus  Characteristics 
Type 1 Europeanization  Growing competence and 
authority of EU actors and 
institutions 
Largely synonymous with 
conceptions of European 
integration 
Type 2 Europeanization  Impact of the EU on 
domestic politics and 
policies 
Emphasis on varying 
responses to varying 
adaptational pressures 
Type 3 Europeanization  Focus on interconnections 
and transfer mechanisms 
between European states 
Has concerns broader than 
and/or separate from EU 
 
While not wishing to add unnecessarily to the many definitions of Europeanization 
that exist, there is a need for a broad definition of Type 2 Europeanization that 
incorporates the concerns of both first and second generation analysis. To this end, 
Europeanization is simply defined here as: 
 
a redirection of policies and/or practices and/or preferences in the domestic 
arena towards those advanced by dominant EU level actors/institutions.  
 
A Governance Approach  
A governance approach to Europeanization is taken here for a number of reasons: 
 
•  it facilitates investigation of the whole policy process, from policy formulation 
through to policy outcomes: this is a specific advantage in this context because 
of the importance of national institutions and actors at the implementation 
stage of EU policies. 
•  it points to the importance of variation by sector (an observation made in 
Europeanization studies) and thus facilitates cross-sectoral comparisons; 
•  it investigates the role of a broad range of actors in policy-making, rather 
than assuming in advance that some are more important than others 
•  it points to a segmented rather than unified executive: a feature of extant 
Europeanization studies is that government departments respond to 
Europeanization pressures in different ways;  8 
•  it focuses on interdependence between actors, while acknowledging that this 
interdependence may be asymmetrical. 
 
Definitions of governance abound (for different perspectives, see Pierre, 2000). 
However, common in most definitions of governance is the idea that there is wide 
participation of public, private and voluntary actors in the policy process. However, 
wide participation does not necessarily mean the diffusion of power. The extent to 
which power is diffused is a matter for empirical investigation by sector and/or if 
necessary, by issue.  
 
For purposes of domestic sensitivity outlined earlier, the governance approach 
presented here draws on the notion of the differentiated polity and the related 
concepts of policy networks and the core executive to provide a framework for 
investigating Type 2 Europeanization in Britain. 
 
The Differentiated Polity 
The Differentiated Polity (DP) model of British government was developed by 
Rhodes (1997) as a critique of the dominant Westminster Model (WM). The DP 
model highlights the changing nature of politics and policy-making in Britain and, in 
particular, identifies constraints on executive power. Table 3 (below) develops the 
notion of the differentiated polity by contrasting its central features with those of the 
Westminster model.  
 
Table 3. Comparing the Westminster Model with the Differentiated Polity 
 
Westminster Model 
 
Differentiated Polity 
Centralised state  Hollowed-out state 
  
General  
 
Principles 
Hierarchy Heterarchy 
Control Steering 
Clear lines of accountability  Multiple lines of accountability 
                                         
                                               ‘External’ 
 
Dimensions 
National sovereignty  Shared/Negotiated sovereignty 
British foreign policy  Multiple foreign policy 
                                 
                                                ‘Internal’ 
 
Dimensions 
Unitary State  Quasi-federal state 
Parliamentary sovereignty  Inter-institutional bargaining 
Multi-level bargaining 
Strong executive  Segmented executive 
Unified civil service  Fragmented civil service 
Political constitution  Quasi-judicial constitution 
British foreign policy  Multiple foreign policies 
 
Source: Bache and Flinders (forthcoming) 
  9 
 
While the DP model suggests the policy process is characterized by fragmentation, 
contestation and the exchange of resources, it does not imply that power is equally 
distributed: the precise distribution of power is a matter for empirical investigation. 
Moreover, there is acknowledgement within the literature that central government 
retains a pivotal position through its relatively greater control of resources relative to 
other domestic actors (Rhodes, 1997: 15). In general terms, the relationship between 
the centre and other domestic ones is characterized by asymmetric interdependence, 
but the specific balance fluctuates across sectors and over time. 
 
In one sense, the governance approach reveals nothing particularly new: central 
government has always depended on other actors in the policy process (particularly 
for policy implementation). It is the degree of interdependence that has changed due 
to the scale of fragmentation and subsequent proliferation of actors involved in 
policy-making, whether driven by internal reforms (such as privatisation, 
quangoization and devolution etc.) or external pressures (such as European integration 
and globalization). As a theory of the policy process, the notion of governance awaits 
further refinement. However, in the context of contemporary British politics it offers a 
more suitable lens through which to view the domestic mediating processes of 
Europeanization than does the Westminster Model. In examining these processes, the 
policy networks approach provides a valuable framework. 
 
 
The Policy Networks Approach 
 
The Rhodes Model 
RAW Rhodes (1981) developed the policy networks model, which was subsequently 
applied to the study of the EU by Peterson (1992; 1995), and others. According to the 
Rhodes model, a policy network is a set of resource-dependent organisations. 
Networks have different structures of dependencies that vary along five key 
dimensions: the constellation of interests; membership; vertical interdependence; 
horizontal interdependence; and the distribution of resources (Rhodes 1988: 77-8).   
 
Rhodes (1988) distinguished between five different types of networks ranging from 
highly integrated policy communities to loosely integrated issue networks.  Between 
these, on what is seen as a continuum, are professional networks, intergovernmental 
networks and producer networks respectively.  At one end of the continuum, policy 
communities are characterised by ‘stability of relationships, continuity of a highly 
restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery 
responsibilities and insulation from other networks and invariably from the general 
public (including Parliament).  They have a high degree of vertical interdependence 
and limited horizontal articulation’ (Rhodes 1988: 78).  At the other end of the 
continuum, issue networks are distinguished by their large number of participants and 
limited degree of interdependence.  The structure tends to be atomistic and stability 
and continuity are 'at a premium' (Rhodes 1988: 78). 
 
Power dependence  
A central feature of the policy networks approach is the notion of power dependence. 
Organisations within networks are considered interdependent: each organisation is 
dependent on others for certain resources - financial, informational, political,  10 
organizational or constitutional-legal – and it is the extent to which an organisation 
controls and can mobilise these resources which determines its power in a given 
situation.  These 'resource dependencies' are the key variable in shaping policy 
outcomes.  As Peterson and Bomberg (1993: 28) put it, ‘They set the “chessboard” 
where private and public interests manoeuvre for advantage’.  However, 
interdependence is  ‘almost always asymmetrical’ and in some cases it is possible to 
talk of 'unilateral leadership' within networks (Rhodes 1986b: 5).   
 
Policy implementation 
A particular strength of the policy networks approach is its emphasis on policy 
implementation as an important phase in policy-making, which Rhodes described as: 
 
‘a process of bargaining between conflicting interests.  Policy does not 'fail' 
but is actually made in the course of negotiations between the (ostensible) 
implementers’ (Rhodes 1986a, p14).   
 
The implementation stage of EU policy-making can offer domestic actors 
considerable scope for shaping policy outcomes. This is an important aspect of both 
Type 1 and Type 2 Europeanization, a point that has been long recognized. 
 
‘it is only by examining the implementation phases that we can begin to gauge 
the effectiveness of Community policies in relation to the objectives sought, or 
to assess whether the experience of member governments and other national 
agencies at this stage increases or decreases their support for an extension of 
Community activity’ (Wallace, 1977: 57). 
 
While the policy networks approach can help explain policy outcomes, it does not 
constitute a predictive theory. As Peterson and Bomberg (1993: 31) argued:  
 
‘Policy networks are essentially descriptive theoretical tools which simply 
help order facts and evidence in novel ways.  However, policy networks can 
be used to anticipate and explain policy outputs by providing insights into how 
and why decisions were taken which produced them’.  
 
 
The Core Executive Approach 
The core executive approach suggests that the heart of government should be seen not 
merely as the important formal institutions (government departments, the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Cabinet and related committees etc.), but also the networks that 
surround them. The relative influence of the core executive in a given situation is 
related to the extent to which it controls and mobilises resources of the type outlined 
above. Formal institutional structures provide a framework of resource distribution 
within which actors operate, but do not determine policy outcomes. The effectiveness 
of actors is in large part dependent on ‘the tactics, choices and strategies they adopt in 
using their resources’ (Smith, 1999, 5). 
 
Central government is not a monolith and traditional domestic politics concepts of 
cabinet government and prime ministerial power do not provide the tools for us to 
investigate the interdependence that is at the heart of government. By contrast, the 
emphasis of the core executive approach on this interdependence, on both formal  11 
institutions and informal processes and on the need to disaggregate government 
provides greater sensitivity to understanding the influence of central government in 
mediating the pressures of Europeanization. 
 
Case Study: European Regional Policy 
It is well established that policy implementation does not necessarily flow easily from 
policy decision. Studies of the EU have revealed considerable barriers in the way of 
policy implementation, with EU actors largely dependent on domestic actors for this 
stage of the process. As such, we cannot read from EU level agreements that this will 
inevitably result in Type 2 Europeanization. Studies of Europeanization have shown 
varying degrees to which preferences, practices and policies in the domestic arena 
have been redirected towards those advocated by dominant EU actors. But there are 
two issues that need separating here: one is the direct (or intended) impact of an EU 
initiative (e.g. EU regional policy) on the Member State; the other is the indirect (or 
inadvertent) impact on the Member State (e.g. on domestic regional policy measures).  
 
It is based on these observations that the definition for Type 2 Europeanization 
preferred here refers to changes in policies and/or practices and/or preferences ‘in the 
domestic arena’ rather than changes in ‘domestic policies and/or practices and/or 
preferences’. The latter suggests an emphasis on the impact on domestically 
determined initiatives only, while the former incorporates these and the broader 
impact of EU-led initiatives also. 
 
Drawing on the policy transfer literature (see Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) a further 
useful distinction may be drawn between Europeanization that is voluntary (i.e., 
embraced by key domestic actors) and coercive (opposed by key domestic actors). 
Again, there may be a distinction here between direct and indirect impacts. Thus, 
voluntary-direct Europeanization would be the ready adoption of EU decisions in a 
given area; while voluntary-indirect would refer to adaptation of EU preferences 
and/or practices and/or policies in another area (e.g. adopting EU approaches to 
regional policy in domestic regional policy). Similarly, coercive-direct 
Europeanization refers to the forced acceptance of European preferences and/or 
practices and/or policies in a given area, while coercive-indirect refers to spillover 
consequences of coercive-direct Europeanization in one area to another. 
 
The two case studies consider both voluntary and coercive Europeanization in relation 
to two aspects of EU regional policy: policy content and delivery structures.  
 
Policy Content 
Since its creation in 1975, European regional policy has required that projects funded 
by EU grants be additional to any planned domestic regional projects. It also required 
that EU grants be matched by domestic funding (usually a 50-50 split between 
domestic and EU funds). This ‘match funding’ requirement was designed to secure 
‘complementarity’ between EU regional policy and national regional policies. This 
also implied that a significant proportion of domestic funds would be steered towards 
regional development projects that reflected EU priorities. 
 
For reasons that are well documented elsewhere (for example, Bache, 1999) the 
Commission had good reason to believe that EU regional funding was not treated as 
additional spending in the British localities targeted, but was instead treated as general  12 
income to the Treasury and used to subsidize financial allocations to the Department 
of Environment (DoE) and other ministries responsible for financing local 
government. UK Central Government allocations to local authorities did not 
distinguish between domestic and European components, making it impossible for the 
Commission to prove that EU grants had merely been used to reduce planned 
domestic allocations to local authorities. 
 
Central government could anticipate the likely sums it would receive through EU 
regional funding because ‘indicative quotas’ for each member state were agreed by 
the European Council at the start of each programme period. However, before any EU 
grants were allocated to Britain, projects had to be forwarded to the Commission for 
approval. In the selection process, these projects were heavily vetted by the 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) to ensure that they reflected government 
priorities. By not overbidding for EU grants (i.e., not submitting projects of financial 
value in excess of the indicative quota), the British government left the Commission 
with little discretion over project approval. 
 
In short, European funds were largely spent on projects that would have been funded 
by local authorities and/or central government in the absence of EU grants: 
additionality was largely absent and, in terms of changing domestic policy, so was 
Europeanization. 
 
A turning point came after the 1988 reform of the structural funds. The new 
regulation agreed made additionality more difficult to avoid and introduced the 
partnership principle for administering the funds. The British government’s refusal to 
meet the new requirements on additionality led to a dispute over the RECHAR 
programme for coalfield local authorities in 1991-92. The Commission refused to 
release RECHAR funds to Britain until central government changed its policy. In 
doing this, the Commission had the full support of British local authorities in the 
eligible regions (see Bache, 1998).  
 
This dispute led to Cabinet splits that leaked into the public domain and threatened 
Conservative Party electoral prospects in coalfield seats in the February 1992 general 
election. Following this dispute, the British government agreed to make its accounting 
procedures for European funds transparent. Despite initial evidence to the contrary, 
this did not ensure that European regional funds were additional to planned domestic 
regional spending, but did mean at least that European funds went to the localities the 
Commission intended. In addition, the partnership principle – which made the 
Commission and local authorities formal partners in the process of project selection 
for the first time – made it more difficult for central government to shape funding 
priorities: more difficult, but not impossible (below). 
 
In terms of the governance approach, this brief case study illustrates a number of 
things. First, it points to the specificities of this particular policy area: principles of 
EU regional funding challenged domestic control over both public expenditure limits 
and public expenditure priorities. As such, it was fiercely resisted by a central 
government committed to the control of public spending. Second, the governance 
approach points to the need to disaggregate central government: in this policy area, 
there were tensions between departments within government, but studies have 
revealed that in this case at least, the Treasury was the key actor within the Core  13 
Executive: it secured an outcome from the RECHAR dispute that did not challenge its 
control over public expenditure limits, even though the deal that was struck did have 
implications for the policy control of the DoE and DTI (see Bache and George, 2001). 
Third, the governance approach emphasises the importance of implementation: EU 
policy has not been made until domestic actors have implemented it and this case 
illustrated the degree to which domestic actors can frustrate EU policy intentions. 
Fourth, the policy networks approach highlights interdependence between actors 
involved in EU policy-making. While central government retained a pivotal role in 
the policy process, and its relations with subnational actors were highly asymmetric, 
all actors had resources. For example, in supporting the Commission during the 
RECHAR dispute, British local authorities mobilised their political resources to 
support the Commission and in doing so reduced the legitimacy of central government 
policy. 
 
Underpinning this dispute over additionality between the Commission and central 
government was ideological conflict. While it was a British Conservative government 
that was instrumental in the creation of EU regional policy, funding from this was 
always seen (by both Conservative and Labour governments) as reimbursement for 
Britain’s contributions to the EU budget. With the election of a neo-liberal 
government in 1979, this position was reinforced by the dominant idea within 
government that markets should be subject to minimal intervention by the state. In 
short, the post-1979 Conservative governments did not support the principle of state 
intervention in disadvantaged regions, as illustrated by the reduction of domestic 
regional policy measures in this period. The government welcomed EU regional 
funds, but not for the purposes the Commission intended. Interestingly, while the 
election of a Labour government in 1997 with a greater ideological commitment to 
regional intervention led to more central funding to provide matching funds for EU 
grants, it did not lead to the Treasury relaxing its grip over the financial controls even 
in context of political devolution (see Bache and Bristow forthcoming). 
 
 
Process: the partnership principle 
The 1988 reform of the structural funds introduced the partnership principle. This 
meant that, for the first time, subnational and supranational actors would play a 
formal role in the administration of programmes within member states. Initially, this 
would include local and regional authorities and the Commission, but would go on to 
incorporate a broader range of societal interests, including trade unions and non-
governmental organisations. 
 
While justified by the Commission in terms of administrative efficiency, the 
partnership principle was viewed as having a strong political dimension in the context 
of competing models of capitalism at the European level. Hooghe (1998: 3) argued 
that during this period at least, the Commission was a ‘bastion of European regulated 
capitalism’, with Jacques Delors as the ‘driving force’. Delors ‘forged the link 
between this project and current cohesion policy in the years 1986-88’ (Hooghe 1998: 
3). The partnership principle was a central feature of this policy.  
 
In the period from 1988 to the mid-1990s, the Commission’s concept of partnership 
was resisted both institutionally and politically within Britain. The principle of 
partnership itself was not opposed within Britain. Indeed, the Conservative  14 
government had encouraged the formation of public-private partnerships for 
implementing domestic urban policy. It was specifically the Commission’s concept of 
partnership that was opposed. Central government resisted the transfer of authority 
both downwards to local authorities and upwards to the European Commission. In 
addition to this institutional resistance was political resistance. The neo-liberal 
Conservative government was ideologically opposed to enhancing the role of trade 
unions in policy-making and to empowering the local state. The government’s 
response was to exclude trade unions and local councillors from the policy process 
(officers represented local authorities instead) and to chair and administer the 
partnerships to ensure a firm central government steer. 
 
The only significant variation in how British structural fund partnerships operated in 
this period was in Western Scotland, where partnership thrived. This happened 
because the nature of the policy community in Western Scotland differed from those 
of the eligible regions in England and Wales. Here, the policy community was 
relatively cohesive. This cohesiveness was built on an established tradition of 
partnership working within a geographically concentrated policy community pursuing 
common objectives. The relative autonomy of the Scottish Office from Whitehall, 
facilitated in part by political pressures in Scotland, allowed it to play a role in the 
policy community that was distinct from its counterparts in England and Wales.  
 
The Commission proved a useful ally to partners in Western Scotland seeking to 
develop mechanisms for effective partnership. However, while the Commission 
sought to place pressure on the British government to operate more partnerships in a 
similar manner in the rest of Britain, it did so with little success. In short, where there 
was evidence of Europeanization in partnership forms before the mid-1990s, this was 
limited. Moreover, while the Western Scotland partnership model was closer to that of 
the Commission’s in terms of both involving and empowering subnational actors, this 
model was very much in line with existing practices and was willingly adopted by the 
Scottish Office and other partners. 
  
From the mid-1990s onwards there was less variation in partnership working across 
Britain. While the Conservative government took the first steps towards inclusivity, 
this process accelerated following the change of government in 1997. Evidence 
suggests a decline in the Conservative government’s resistance towards the 
Commission’s partnership model, partly through policy learning and partly for 
pragmatic reasons. In particular, conflict over partnership composition was 
increasingly seen as a distraction from focusing on policy-making and thus hindered 
policy effectiveness. Poor policy performance in some British regions undermined 
their prospects for receiving further discretionary funding from the Commission. 
 
In the run-up to the 1997 general election, the Conservative government began to 
make some concessions towards the Commission model and hinted at more should it 
be re-elected (although it did not suggest any ground would be given over trade union 
participation). However, the election of a Labour government reduced ideological 
conflict with the Commission model and trade unions were included immediately 
after the election. 
 
In relation to this case study, the governance framework again reveals the importance 
of the core executive approach. One of the explanatory factors in relation to variation  15 
in the degree of Europeanization was the relative autonomy of the Scottish Office 
within the core executive. Interdependence is also a key feature of this key study. 
Central government’s position on partnership was undermined by the disruption and 
distraction it caused within the partnerships themselves. Objections by some partners 
to government policy on councillor and trade union involvement meant meetings 
often focused on this issue, to the detriment of policy delivery. This in turn led civil 
servants in the regions to signal the need to the centre for some relaxation of policy to 
improve policy performance and enhance the prospects for further discretionary 
funding from the Commission.  
 
As with the case study on additionality, disputes over the Commission’s partnership 
model were underpinned by ideological differences. While changes in partnership 
arrangements were beginning under the Conservative government, that this process 
accelerated under Labour illustrates the importance of shared preferences in relation 
to Europeanization. While policy learning and political pragmatism may have moved 
the Conservative government closer to the Commission model of partnership, 
ideological opposition to some aspects of this (notably, trade union participation) 
remained. This final barrier was removed with the election of a government tolerant 
of trade union participation in policy-making. 
 
 
Conclusion: assessing the governance approach 
A number of hypotheses were generated from the survey of ‘first generation’ 
Europeanization studies.  For the most part, these hypotheses were validated in the 
case study on regional policy. First, pre-existing structures influenced both domestic 
adaptation to policy content and process. The consequence was an initial mix of non-
adaptation and domestic adaptation with national colours, with the latter response 
more evident over time. The reason this response pattern occurred was in part 
explained by the second hypothesis: as the legal foundation for EU regional policy 
requirements was clarified and strengthened, the prospects for coercive 
Europeanization increased.  
 
It is difficult in one case study to test the third hypothesis – which it is that the 
specific Europeanization mechanism rather than the nominal policy area is most 
important in determining the domestic impact of EU policies. The evidence presented 
here suggests that the policy area was important in shaping the domestic response; in 
particular the challenge of the additionality requirement to domestic control over 
public spending. However, the claims of the third hypotheses can only tested when 
regional policy is compared with other policy areas. Finally, the fourth hypothesis was 
proven: that Europeanization is most likely to occur when there is both domestic 
administrative and political support for compliance. The case study here illustrated 
that when both important institutions and political actors opposed elements of EU 
regional policy, Europeanization was limited. When, for a variety of reasons, this 
opposition softened, voluntary Europeanization was more evident. 
 
The arguments in favour of the governance approach to Europeanization have been 
outlined above. To summarize, this approach has the advantage of conceptualising 
both first and second generation Europeanization concerns. The policy networks 
approach highlights top-down, bottom-up, vertical and horizontal exchanges between 
actors. It incorporates ideas and ‘the political dynamics of fit’ through the concept of  16 
political legitimacy, resources of which fluctuate according to the convergence or 
divergence of actor preferences, which are partly shaped by ideas. The process of both 
voluntary and involuntary adaptation to Europeanization pressures can be 
conceptualized through the framework of power dependence, which highlights the 
range of resources that actors control and mobilise in a given situation. Smith’s (1999) 
work on the core executive further highlights the importance of actor tactics and 
strategies in utilising resources. Sectoral variation is anticipated by the governance 
approach, which highlights the importance of the different nature of resource 
exchanges within sectoral policy networks to explain such variations. 
 
Finally, the case study of EU regional policy by definition deals with the direct effects 
of EU decisions, rather than indirect consequences on other areas. In this policy area, 
there is initial evidence of voluntary-indirect Europeanization in terms of domestic 
regional policy funding cycles being brought into line with those for EU funds to 
enhance policy effectiveness and maximize EU grant take-up (Catney, forthcoming). 
The full extent of this impact on domestic regional policy and the possible 
consequences of the Europeanization of regional policy in other policy areas await 
further investigation. 
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